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AIR POLLUTION: BUILDING
ON THE SUCCESSES
DAVID SCHOENBROD, JOEL SCHWARTZ & Ross SANDLER*
INTRODUCTION
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Congress required
the states to regulate air pollution according to federal
specifications. The federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) would set national ambient air quality standards through an
administrative process. Each state would then, through separate
administrative processes, adopt a plan intended to compel emission
sources within its borders to achieve emission reductions sufficient
to meet EPA air quality standards by specified deadlines. The
Supreme Court soon concluded that this .two-step administrative
process was the "heart" of the Clean Air Act.' With it, the Court
opined in famously quotable words, Congress took "a stick to the
States."2  The federal stick was aimed at the states, not the
polluters.
The evidence from thirty-eight years under this scheme shows
that federal air pollution regulation achieved the greatest pollution
reductions when the requirements were aimed directly at reducing
emissions from pollution sources rather than at requiring states to
comply with federal planning procedures. We propose that
Congress stop regulating the states and focus on regulating the
largest factories and other industrial sources. By directly
regulating several thousand such sources, as well as continuing to
regulate new vehicles directly, and certain other nationally-
marketed goods (mainly fuels, paints, and solvents), the federal
government would itself control the lion's share of interstate
We thank Barbara Bankoff, Carol Casazza Herman, William F. Pedersen,
and Richard B. Stewart for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts as well as
Wen Yan Schieffelin, Peter A. Schikler, both New York Law School Class of
2008, and Melissa A. Witte, New York Law School Class of 2009, for their
diligent research assistance.
Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 66 (1975).
2 Id. at 64.
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pollution. Congress should leave the remaining sources--the
overwhelming majority in terms of the numbers of facilities-to
the states.
This approach builds on four federal efforts that achieved the
biggest successes in reducing emissions. Each of these efforts
involved direct Congressional action:
* Congress reduced urban smog from cars by directing that
auto manufacturers cut emissions from new cars by 90
percent from 1970 levels.
" Congress removed the most ubiquitous source of
atmospheric lead when it effectively mandated that
motorists use lead-free gas in new cars because the leaded
variety would ruin their emission control systems.
* Congress, in a 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act aimed
at reducing acid rain, required that power plants cut their
emissions of sulfur dioxide by 50 percent from 1980 levels.
* Congress, also in 1990, acting to implement the Montreal
Protocol, banned the production of most chemicals that
harm stratospheric ozone.
These four provisions produced large reductions in air
pollution. Today, average automobile emissions per mile are
down at least 90 percent below mid-1960s levels. 3  The most
recent models are near-zero-emission vehicles, with emissions
more than 99 percent lower than those of cars built before the mid-
1970s.4 Gasoline no longer contains lead. Sulfur dioxide (SO 2)
emissions from power plants are down 43 percent since 1990.
5
Production of most ozone depleting chemicals has ended.
All four of these parts of the Clean Air Act involved direct
action. Congress made the two pivotal decisions-how much
3 A. W. GERTLER, ET AL., EMISSIONS FROM DIESEL AND GASOLINE ENGINES
MEASURED IN HIGHWAY TUNNELS (Health Effects Institute 2002); Gary A.
Bishop & Donald H. Stedman, A Decade of On-Road Emissions Measurements,
42 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 1651, 1654-56 (2008), available at http://pubs.acs.org/
cgi-bin/sample.cgi/esthag/asap/pdf/es702413b.pdf?isMac = 195617.
4 Bishop and Stedman, supra note 3; J. F. Collins, et al., Measurements of
In-Use Emissions from Modern Vehicles Using an On-Board Measurement
System, 41 ENVTL. Sc. & TECH. 6554 (2007); James Ehlmann & George Wolff,
Mobile Emissions: The Road Toward Zero, ENVTL. MANAGER, Jan. 2005, at 33.
5 According to -EPA data, power plant SO 2 emissions dropped 43 percent
from 1990-2007. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR MARKETS - DATA
AND MAPS, http://camddataandmaps.epa.gov/gdm/index.cfm (last visited Sept.
30, 2008).
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pollution should be cut, and by whom. EPA's role was to
.implement the restrictions as Congress directed.
Another common feature is that Congress gave the pollution
sources flexibility on how to achieve the desired results. For
example, with the acid rain program, Congress set an overall cap
on emissions and to achieve it employed a cap-and-trade system
that allowed sources to decide how to distribute the pollution
reduction burden among themselves and how to achieve it. This
flexible system gave sources a financial incentive to find new ways
to cut emissions. Congress used a similar approach for lead in
gasoline and ozone-depleting chemicals and allowed some
flexibility for meeting the new-vehicle standards.
The parts of the Clean Air Act that were less effective in
reducing emissions took a round-about approach that involved
large doses of process and administration prior to, and along with,
each increment of actual pollution reduction and allowed sources
much less flexibility on how to reduce emissions. Chief among
them were the provisions that took "a stick to the States."'6 Citing
those provisions, Congress told voters in 1970, "all Americans in
all parts of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the
1970s. ' 7 Yet, the nation missed this goal by decades. Pollution
levels were drastically reduced, but how much of that reduction
was due to the post-1970 federal planning process is unclear.
States in the 1960s did more to cut two key stationary source
pollutants-SO 2 and particulate matter-than was accomplished in
the 1970s after EPA took charge.8 Moreover, pollutants that were
perceived to pose health risks-mainly particulates, SO2, and (in
Los Angeles) ozone-were declining for decades before 1970,
without a discernible increase in the rate of improvement after the
federal government took over.
9
6 Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. at 66.
7 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970) (statement of Senator Muskie).
8 Douglas Costle, EPA Administrator, Remarks at the Meeting of the Air
Pollution Control Association in Montreal, Canada (June 23, 1980). He was
speaking of reductions achieved from 1964-72, but acknowledged that those
came from state actions in the 1960s. On state progress in the 1960s, see, e.g.,
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553, 578-83 (2001).
9 Indur M. Goklany, Empirical Evidence Regarding the Role of
Nationalization in Improving U.S. Air Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27, 30 (R. Meiners & A. Morriss, eds. 2000).
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From this thirty-eight-year-long experience we draw three
lessons that inform our recommendations. First, the greatest and
most rapid reductions in air pollution were accomplished when the
federal government, by direct congressional act, set actual
emission targets. When Congress instead left that decision to
agency administrative processes, less pollution abatement
occurred. Second, these emission cuts were often facilitated by
methods that gave sources flexibility in how to reduce emissions
and incentives to do so. Third, states proved at least as effective as
the federal government in abating air pollution in situations where
local impacts dominated.
To act on these lessons and to focus the Clean Air Act on
results and away from process, we propose that:
1. Congress should impose direct federal regulation on the
largest industrial sources. This regulation should, to the extent
feasible, be modeled on the power-plant SO 2 program-that is,
with a "cap-and-trade" program and with emission limits that are
not dependent on whether a source is "existing" or "new."' 0
2. Congress should continue direct federal regulation of
emissions for new vehicles, fuels, and paints and solvents.
Among issues to be left to the states should be emission
inspections of cars in use. This requirement should be eliminated
as largely ineffective or, in the alternative, federal oversight should
be replaced by a federal target directed at grossly emitting vehicles
that states may achieve in any manner they wish.
Businesses should be given the maximum feasible latitude in
10 We do not address the question of whether an emissions tax would be
superior to cap-and-trade. Cap-and-trade would be an improvement over the
present command-and-control approach to conventional pollutants and legislators
do not seem to be seriously considering an emissions tax approach to these
pollutants. When it comes to climate change, however, prominent authors have
argued that a -revenue-neutral emissions tax is a superior to a cap-and-trade
approach. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE (Yale
University Press 2008); KENNETH P. GREEN, STEVEN F. HAYWARD, AND KEVIN
A. HASSETT, CLIMATE CHANGE: CAPs vs. TAXES (American Enterprise Institute
2007), available at http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,publD.26286/
pub-detail.asp. Others have disagreed. See, e.g., RICHARD B. STEWART &
JONATHAN B. WEINER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY 66, 68-75 (AEI Press
2003) (discussing advantages of emissions trading over emissions taxes in
domestic and international greenhouse gas regulation).
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how to achieve the congressionally-set targets for federally
regulated sources, and states should have some latitude to impose
tougher requirements.
3. Congress should restore to the states the choice of how to
address the remaining sources. The only exception should be a
backstop provision for the unlikely event that the remaining
sources cause an interstate pollution problem. Otherwise, the
federal government's role would be limited to providing
information to the states and the public on levels and trends in air
pollution, its consequences, and the means of its control.
Our recommendations would put the focus on results, rather
than process, and give the federal government the manageable job
of regulating a few thousand pollution sources rather than
hundreds of thousands of individual sources, but would
nevertheless put under federal control the vast majority of
interstate pollution.
Should the federal government choose to control greenhouse
gases, whether through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax, such control
could be melded into our division of authority, since we already
place the largest sources of greenhouse gases-motor vehicles and
fuels, power plants, and large industrial plants-under federal
control. In contrast, the command-and-control approach to
conventional air pollutants is antithetical to a cap-and-trade or
carbon tax approach to greenhouse gases for many reasons,
including that it takes away from sources the flexibility to adapt
that is the primary virtue of cap-and-trade or a carbon tax
approach."
I. CONGRESS SHOULD IMPOSE DIRECT FEDERAL REGULATION
ON THE LARGEST INDUSTRIAL SOURCES
After twenty years of experience, Congress, with the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, tried a new approach to stationary-
source regulation when it created a "cap-and-trade" program for
power plants. It placed a declining cap on total emissions of SO 2
" William F. Pedersen, Adapting Environmental Law to Global Warming
Controls, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 256 (2008); see also Lisa Margonelli, Waste
Not: A Steamy Solution to Global Warming, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
2008, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200805/recycled-steam.
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from these sources, put emission credits equal to the cap into the
hands of power plants, and prohibited any plant from emitting in
excess of the emissions credits it holds. Congress achieved
flexibility by allowing sources to control their emissions in any
verifiable way they chose and to have the additional option of
trading emission credits among sources. Cap-and-trade was a
radical departure from the traditional mode of regulation,
sometimes dubbed "command-and-control," in which regulators
assign an emission limit to each smokestack, vent, or other
pollution source in each facility, and limit companies' flexibility in
how to comply with the emission limits.
Cap-and-trade was radical in two ways. First, it focused on
results-the desired pollution reductions-but did not tell
companies by what means they must achieve these results.
Second, it gave companies the opportunity to trade pollution
credits. Having sources meet a performance standard, rather than
install specific types of equipment, created competition among
pollution abatement technologies and methods, thus reducing
costs, stimulating innovation, and allowing sources to take
advantage of changing marketplace conditions.' 2 The ability to
trade reduced costs further by allowing facilities with high
pollution-reduction costs to buy credits from facilities with lower
costs created even greater incentives for innovation by making
every increment of pollution reduction a valuable commodity.
Under the cap-and-trade program, the costs of reducing SO 2 from
power plants dropped by more than half, saving the public
billions.13 The potential for these savings was key to Congress
enacting the acid rain program in the first place.
The approach taken in the acid rain SO 2 program has many
other advantages over traditional regulation. The first section of
this part, which examines the traditional approach to interstate
pollution and its shortcomings, will outline those advantages. The
second section details our five recommendations, which in
summary are that Congress: (1) extend the acid rain program from
12 See, e.g., Lorena Bark Malecha et al., San Francisco Bay Area Boatyards:
A Case Study in Regulating Small Polluters, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 453,
474-75 (1993) (pointing out that performance standards are believed to afford
more flexibility than design standards, which is important for encouraging
innovation and economically efficient regulation).
13 Dallas Burtraw et al., Economics of Pollution Trading for S0 2 and NO., 30
ANN. REv. ENV'T & REs. 253, 264 (2005).
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power plants to all categories of sources whose members are the
biggest contributors to interstate pollution; (2) integrate all
pollutant limits into a common framework, rather than regulate
them piecemeal; (3) regulate through cap-and-trade (rather than
command-and-control) all source categories for which it is
possible to measure emissions, with the same emission limits for
existing and new sources; (4) decide how to set emission caps and
allocate emission credits; and (5) choose which sources to subject
to direct federal regulation so as to address most interstate
pollution while minimizing the total number of federally regulated
stationary sources.
A. The Present Program
A key rationale for national air pollution legislation was that
pollution crosses state boundaries. Congress inserted in the 1970
statute a requirement that EPA disapprove a state implementation
plan (SIP) if the plan would inflict too much pollution on
downwind states. EPA did not disapprove a SIP on the basis of
interstate pollution until 1998-twenty-eight years after the
statute's adoption.'
4
One reason for the failure was that the agency lacked the
political muscle to allocate expensive burdens among contending
states, each championed by its own congressional delegation. As a
result, in a bizarre twist on the federal role, EPA policed intrastate
pollution, but not interstate pollution. Even more perversely, some
states satisfied EPA's requirements on intrastate pollution by
letting power plants build tall stacks that wafted the pollution to
downwind states.1 5 In other words, the Clean Air Act actually
caused much of today's interstate pollution.
Since 1998, the agency has acted aggressively on interstate
pollution, most notably with the NOx "SIP Call" and later with the
Clean Air Interstate Rule. The task is, however, a difficult one for
the agency, not only because of political obstacles, but also
because EPA is imposing federal regulations under cover of the
SIP process, which contemplates states acting individually to
14 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON:
How CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES
THE PEOPLE 127 (Yale University Press 2005).
15 Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2350-54 (1996).
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reduce emissions within their borders. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently vacated the Clean Air
Interstate Rule on the basis that the agency's methodology did not
track the statute's logic.' 6 This suggests that the agency might
well not be able to use a similar methodology for dealing with
greenhouse gases. In any event, the decision is a setback for
dealing with conventional pollutants. Indeed, a New York Times
editorial, "A Major Setback for Clean Air," called for legislation to
fix the problem, which our proposal would do.
17
The federal government would do a better job discharging
federal responsibilities if Congress specified the emission limits,
rather than shifting this responsibility to EPA. That is what
Congress did in 1990 when it added to the Clean Air Act the
program to limit power plant emissions of SO2. Congress wrote the
emission limits on power plants directly into the statute, rather
than requiring EPA to arbitrate between contending states. This
program reduced some pollitants from power plants, but it does
not apply to all pollutants that they send across state lines and does
not apply to other sources. Significant interstate pollution remains
and is left to the erratic and slow SIP planning process.
While cap-and-trade proved viable where it was applied,'
8
provisions elsewhere in the Clean Air Act were hostile to this
method. Some sections block market-like approaches by imposing
an emission limit that may not be satisfied through trading; other
sections do not forbid trading altogether but discourage it.'
9
Also, the Clean Air Act often has the practical effect of
forcing sources to use particular pollution-control technologies.
The statute tells the agency to set emission limits based on the
emission levels that can be achieved by the best available
technology. Thus, the statute calls for the agency to limit
emissions, rather than specify the control technology, so that
16 N.C. v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 907-08, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
17 Editorial, A Major Setback for Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at
A18. The editorial called for legislation or an administrative solution, but the
latter seems unlikely.
18 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(o) (acid rain program), 7671(f) (allowances
and transfers for ozone depleting substances), 7545(k)(7), (m)(5), (o)(5)
(reformulated fuels programs) (2000).
'9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(1)(B)(2) (2000); see
also Howard K..Gruenspect & Robert N. Stavins, New Source Review Under the
Clean Air Act: Ripe for Reform, 147 RESOURCES 19, 20 (2002), available at
http://www.heartland.org/pdf/10291.pdf.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2008]
N.Y U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
sources can find and use the most economical approaches for their
situation. Nonetheless, companies often feel constrained to use the
same technology that the regulators had in mind in order to avoid
penalties in case a less expensive alternative fails to work as
expected, or with which regulators are less familiar or
comfortable.20 A results-focused approach would allow a source
stuck with a disappointing technology to avoid a penalty by
finding additional ways to control its emissions, while the ability
to trade would allow it to make up any remaining difference by
buying extra emissions credits from other companies that were
more successful at reducing their emissions.
Enforcement is easier under cap-and-trade programs because
it is focused on relatively straightforward determinations of actual
emissions and credits held, rather than on a laundry list of process
and paper-work requirements that may be difficult to understand,
comply with, and monitor and that doesn't necessarily have a
direct relationship to actual emissions. In addition, under cap-and-
trade a source can readily avoid becoming a violator by buying
credits--essentially paying another source to pollute less. For that
reason, violations under the acid rain program are subject to
automatic penalties and violations have been rare. In contrast,
violations are much more common under command-and-control,
and enforcement entails difficult questions about what the source
could have done to avoid it.
There are additional perverse effects of traditional regulation
under the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA and
the states to set different standards for different subcategories of
sources and even different individual sources. As a result,
companies or industries that use inherently high-emitting or
difficult-to-control technologies or processes can receive less
stringent emission limits than other facilities or industries. 21 This
encourages the use of dirtier technologies.
There is still another powerful reason to move from process-
focused to results-focused regulation and to include pollution
trading in any reformed system of air pollution control. It makes it
feasible to put old plants on the same footing as new ones. The
20 See COMM. ON AIR QUALITY MGMT. IN THE U.S., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 174, 187 (2004)
[hereinafter AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT].
21 Byron Swift, Envtl. Law Inst., How Environmental Laws Work, 14 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 309, 379-81, 409 (2001).
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Clean Air Act now imposes tougher emission limits on new and
modified sources. This encourages sources to keep old plants
operating far beyond their ordinary economic life and many of
them are left little-controlled, if at all. 2 Prolonging the lives of
inefficient, inherently dirty old plants through perverse regulatory
policies is bad for the environment and for the economy. The new
versus old distinction also creates a barrier to entry for new firms,
reducing competition and slowing innovation. The result is not
only slower progress in reducing air pollution, but also higher
prices and lower quality for consumer goods.23 EPA has attempted
to skirt this flaw in the Clean Air Act by widening the definition of
what constitutes a "modification" that triggers the requirement for
existing sources to meet the stricter standards applicable to new
sources. But this backdoor way of dealing with the problem
introduces uncertainty and encourages companies to shape their
capital expenditures to avoid a "modification," despite adverse
consequences for productivity and pollution control.
The most fundamental reason for reform is that the National
Ambient Air Quality Standard-State Implementation Plan
(NAAQS-SIP) process is neither credible nor effective because it
emphasizes creating and demonstrating compliance with
procedural requirements that are supposed to lead to pollution
reductions rather than actually reducing air pollution itself.24 A
National Research Council study described this concern in
unusually strong language:
The SIP process now mandates extensive amounts of local,
state, and federal agency time and resources in a legalistic, and
often frustrating proposal and review process, which focuses
primarily on compliance with intermediate process steps. The
process probably discourages innovation and experimentation
at the state and local levels; overtaxes the limited financial and
human resources available to the nation's [Air Quality
Management] system at state, local, and federal levels; and
draws attention and resources away from the more germane
issue of ensuring progress towards the goal of meeting the
22 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 188 ("older plants have not
had to make emissions reductions in many cases"); see also id. at 294.
23 Jonathan R. Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101
Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 1720-21,.1729 (2007).
24 R. Shep Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure, in
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 126 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, eds. 1984).
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NAAQS.25
The cumbersomeness of the NAAQS-SIP process has deterred
EPA from applying it to pollutants beyond the six pollutants
already covered in 1971, despite the statutory requirement that the
agency apply it to all air pollutants that EPA comes to judge to be
harmful and that come from many sources. EPA later included
lead, but that was because of a court order in a case brought by
environmental attorneys, including a co-author of this essay.a6
Under the letter of the Clean Air Act, EPA should have included
dozens of other air pollutants, but understandably declined to do
so. 27  EPA's failure to apply the NAAQS-SIP process to new
pollutants is powerful evidence that it no longer makes sense for
pollutants to which it has long applied.
Finally, because of the Clean Air Act's structure and the
inherent complexity of developing and setting standards for a
multiplicity of pollutants and types of sources all at the same time,
sources learn of their obligations piecemeal, increasing the cost
and difficulty of compliance. For example, the NAAQS for
various pollutants are revised at separate times with separate
planning and enforcement deadlines. As a result, states tend to
revise their implementation plans pollutant by pollutant.28  The
piecemeal announcement of obligations is a problem because
sources typically emit many kinds of pollutants and many
25 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 128.
26 NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976). Professor Schoenbrod
served as counsel for NRDC.
27 In implementing the Clean Air Act, EPA has, to a degree, emphasized
parts of the Act that have done the most to cut emissions and de-emphasized
others. It has adopted requirements for large trucks and other heavy-duty
vehicles that emulate those that were reducing pollution from cars and other
light-duty vehicles and additional programs for power-plant emissions that
emulate the 1990 Clean Air Act requirements to reduce sulfur dioxide. See
Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the
Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 FED. REG. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998), [hereinafter NOx SIP
Call]; Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
(Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the
NOx SIP Call, 70 FED. REG. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CAIR].
28 In addition, as the National Research Council (NRC) notes, "Although the
technology-specific control programs have considered a range of pollutants from
the start, consideration has been segmented by the programs, such as NSPS,
MACT, RACT, NSR, and PSD, at federal and state levels operating on different
time frames and under different levels of stringency." AIR QUALITY
MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 188.
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pollutants are controlled by the same methods. Compliance could
be more economical and straightforward if industries learn of their
regulatory obligations all at once.29
B. Recommendations
1. Congress Should Extend the Acid Rain Program from Power
Plants to All Categories of Sources Whose Members Are the
Biggest Contributors to Interstate Pollution
Congress should take the basic principle of the acid rain
program-direct federal regulation of an important interstate
stationary source category-and extend it to include other
categories of sources that contribute significantly to interstate
pollution.
One way to do this is for Congress to institute direct federal
regulation of point sources that belong to the following twelve
stationary source categories: electric services, "electric and other
services combined,, 30 petroleum refiners, paper mills, hydraulic
cement mills, pulp mills, organic chemical plants, primary
aluminum plants, carbon black plants, blast furnaces, lead smelters
and raw sugar mills. The allocation of sources as between federal
and state control is discussed below in recommendation 5.
2. Congress Should Integrate All Pollutant Limits into a
Common Framework, Rather than Regulate Them Piecemeal
In regulating a source category, the new federal program
should, to the extent feasible, announce all at once the emission
limits applicable to all regulated pollutants emitted by that
category. The emission limits will need periodic revision, but
Congress should make every effort to cluster the changes. We do
not underestimate the. difficulty of this task, but suggest that
29 "The result has been to make it difficult for any one facility to implement
multi pollutant controls in a systematic and cost-effective fashion." Id.
30 "Electric and Other Services Combined" (SIC - 4931) consists of
industries primarily providing electricity, but also furnishing other utilities. U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 4931: ELECTRIC AND
OTHER SERVICES COMBINED, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic-manual.display?
id=950&tab=description (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). Industries in which
electricity sales account for 85 percent or more of revenues are listed as "Electric
Services." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 4911:
ELECTRIC SERVICES, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic-manual.display?
id=945&tab=description (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
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success is more likely when evaluating all pollutants associated
with a single industry rather than all industries that might emit a
single pollutant, as the NAAQS-SIP process attempts to do.
3. Congress Should Regulate Through Cap-and-Trade, Rather
than Command-and-Control, with the Same Emission Limits for
Existing and New Sources
Cap-and-trade should be employed within and between all
federally-regulated source categories for which it is possible to
measure emissions. The acid rain program uses continuous
emissions monitors for the fossil-fuel power plants to which it
applies, but such monitors are not presently available for many
other categories. EPA, as the National Research Council has
recommended, should develop monitoring methods for additional
categories. 3' In situations where direct monitoring is not feasible,
emissions might still be reliably estimated through surrogate
measures. This, too, should be a priority for EPA. Congress
should give this work, and the resources to do it, to EPA staff who
have run the acid rain program because this group has an
institutional commitment to, and comfort and experience with,
results-focused regulation.
32
Congress should also provide that sources that exceed their
emission cap under trading programs should be subject to an
automatic fine. In addition, Congress should, as with the acid rain
program, provide for banking of credits over time in order to
encourage early reductions, while at the same time giving firms the
opportunity to create a cushion against volatility in credit costs and
to smooth out lumpiness in the development of new emission-
reduction options.
33
Congress should structure the cap-and-trade program to
remove the incentive to keep old plants in service beyond their
economic lives in order to avoid the tougher limits on new sources.
As the acid rain program illustrates, cap-and-trade provides a way
around this problem. It can mollify existing sources by giving
them emission credits, but requires all sources-new or existing-
31 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 194-95.
32 Robert N. Stavins, Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-
Based Environmental Policies, in HARNESSING THE HURRICANE: THE
CHALLENGE OF MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE (John Donahue & Joseph Nye
eds., 2002), at 11.
33 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 207.
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to hold sufficient credits to cover their emissions. The owner of an
existing source can realize the value of those credits without
keeping that source operating beyond its economic life by selling
the credits to another source, including a new source. The statute
should over time phase down to zero the credits given to existing
sources, so that their owners do not keep them going beyond their
economic life merely to maintain a continued claim on valuable
emission credits. Where cap-and-trade is not feasible and
Congress feels impelled to give existing sources transitional relief,
the statute should phase out the transitional relief in the shortest
possible time.
With cap-and-trade, government controls how much pollution
is emitted, but not where. However, impacts can be a function of
where pollutants are emitted, and a concentration of emissions
might produce a "hot spot." Such hot spots are, according to a
report by the National Research Council, possible in theory but
unlikely in practice and have not occurred in previous cap-and-
trade programs.34 After all, an overall reduction in emissions tends
to reduce pollution everywhere. In addition, a recent analysis of
cap-and-trade programs concluded that facilities that started out
with the highest emissions tended to achieve the largest emission
reductions. 35 Thus, to the extent any hot spots existed, cap-and-
trade tended to "cool" them. This is exactly what economic theory
would predict, since the largest emitters also tend to have the
smallest marginal costs for pollution control. Ambient monitoring
34 Id. at 196, 205, 206 ("Some analysts of cap and trade point out that there is
little possibility that any given area will have negative impacts from the program,
provided the cap is set low enough to reduce emissions by a large percentage";
"Even more significant, regions with the highest emissions such as the north-
central region, have had the largest reductions."); see also Dallas Burtraw & Erin
Mansur, The Environmental Effects of S0 2 Trading and Banking, 33 ENVTL SC.
& TECH. 3489, 3489, 3490 (1999) ("geographic consequences are not consistent
with the fears of the program's critics"; "The Environmental Protection Agency
finds that most allowances surrendered for compliance in 1995 and 1996 were
used in the same state as they were allocated, leading the authors to conclude that
little geographic shifting of emissions due to trading has occurred."). The power
plants subject to the SO 2 trading program were also subject to SIPs to implement
the NAAQS for SO 2, but this federal mandate did not have a practical effect
because ambient SO2 levels were already well below the NAAQS for most of the
country.
35 Byron Swift, Emissions Trading and Hot Spots: A Review of the Major
Programs, 35 ENV'T REPORTER 1020, 1020 (2004) ("all trading programs
examined have led to proportionately greater emissions reductions from the
larger sources").
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data also show that trading has not produced hot spots. Since the
beginning of the acid rain cap-and-trade program, ambient levels
of sulfate, the main type of particulate matter from coal-fired
power plants, have declined everywhere in the U.S., with the
largest declines occurring in areas that began with the highest
sulfate levels.
36
Moreover, states would retain the power to ward off hot spots
by imposing tougher emissions limits on federally regulated
sources. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that hot spots arise
from trading among federally controlled sources, the federal
government can limit trading to specific zones. 37 In sum, as a
National Research Council study concluded, there are ways "to
guard against even the possibility" of hot spots where they are a
concern.
38
Thus, we conclude that concern over hot spots is no reason to
reject cap-and-trade in general. Should, however, a convincing
case be made that particular pollutants are likely to increase, or at
least not decline sufficiently, in some areas under cap-and-trade,
Congress retains the authority to limit trading of such pollutants.
For example, Congress could limit the total amount of emission
credits traded into a given region of the country. Congress could
even exclude a given pollutant from the trading program altogether
and instead place separate not-to-exceed caps on each facility's
emissions. Even if it excludes a pollutant from cap-and-trade,
Congress should still focus on results rather than process by
limiting its role to setting the caps and allowing sources to comply
by whatever techniques they wish, so long as the reductions are
verifiable.
Congress could also provide for regional differentiation in
cases where there is a desire for particularly low pollution levels in
special regions, such as in the case of maximizing visibility in
national parks. This would be straightforward under our proposal
because the sources that emit most of the pollutants that affect
visibility would already be federally regulated. Ammonium
sulfate is by far the most important pollutant affecting visibility in
national parks. For example, in the three parks with the greatest
36 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR STATUS AND TRENDS NETWORK
(CASTNET) (2008), http://www.epa.gov/castnet/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
37 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 206-07.
31 Id. at 206.
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visibility impairment-Great Smoky Mountains, Shenandoah, and
Acadia-ammonium sulfate accounts for more than 80 percent of
visibility impairment on days with the worst visibility and about 60
percent of visibility impairment on days with the best visibility.
39
SO2 emissions are the source of sulfate haze, and the vast majority
of SO2 emissions come from sources under federal regulation in
our plan. Volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides are also
a factor in visibility in some parks, and our plan also puts the vast
majority of these pollutants under federal control.
4. Congress Should Decide How to Set Emission Caps and
Allocate Emission Credits
Congress should begin by deciding how much to cut various
pollutants in a given period of time. It has made this kind of
decision under the existing statute in setting deadlines for
achieving NAAQS in areas that have failed to attain them. Under
the existing statute, however, Congress put the responsibility for
achieving the pollution reduction target on the states and EPA. In
contrast, under our proposal, Congress itself would need to take
responsibility for the critical policy choices-how to allocate the
pollution reduction burden between industries and within
industries.
Congress could allocate emission credits between and within
industries by starting with current emissions and ratcheting them
down. Alternatively, it could, as was done with the acid rain
program, start with estimates of the emissions that would come
from reasonably well controlled sources.
In making these decisions, Congress could itself allocate the
emission credits as it did in the acid rain program. Alternatively,
Congress could guide EPA by providing a benchmark as it did
with new cars in 1970 (reduce emissions 90 percent) or with one
aspect of the hazardous air pollutant program in 1990 ("the
average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12
percent of existing sources"). If, however, Congress has EPA
allocate the emission credits, Congress must give the agency a
realistic metric for decision, because when Congress delegates
critical, politically-charged decisions, the result has typically been
years of delay. Finally, Congress could combine agency
39 John G. Watson, Visibility Science and Regulation, 52 J. AIR & WASTE
MGMT. ASS'N 628, 660 (2002).
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deliberation with legislative responsibility by tasking EPA to
propose allocations which Congress would then vote up or down
on an expedited process.
5. Congress Should Choose Which Sources Should Be Subject to
Direct Federal Regulation so as to Maximize the Coverage of
Interstate Pollution and Minimize the Number of Federally
Regulated Sources
Congress should allocate sources between federal and state
control to maximize the coverage of interstate pollution and
minimize the number of federally regulated sources. We want to
minimize the number of federally controlled sources to reduce the
administrative difficulties for the federal government and also
because, in our view, the federal government should generally let
states and localities decide how to deal with intrastate pollution. A
downside of holding down the number of federally-controlled
sources is that this reduces opportunities for savings through
trading. Nonetheless, our proposal not only widens opportunities
for trading far, far beyond that permitted under current law, but
includes most emissions within the federal regime. Beyond that,
we would allow federally-regulated sources to sell emission credits
to state regulated sources.
We have suggested for the sake of discussion that Congress
provide for direct federal regulation of "point sources" that belong
to twelve specific stationary source categories out of the 874
categories included in EPA's "AirData" for 1999.40 These twelve
categories include 3,225 point sources out of 52,194 point sources
listed overall. In sum, we recommend federal regulation of only
about 6 percent of all "point sources."
EPA's data includes, in addition to "point sources," two other
groups of sources: "mobile sources" and "area sources." 4' Area
sources in EPA's data include, to name some examples, many
smaller industrial sources, commercial establishments such as dry
cleaners, restaurants, buildings and houses, farms, construction
sites (due to dust kicked up during construction) and forest fires.42
40 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIRDATA: ACCESS TO AIR POLLUTION DATA
(2007), http://www.epa.gov/air/data/index.html (last visited on Feb. 25, 2008)
(the 1999 data is the most recent available).
41 EPA lumps mobile sources in with area sources in AirData but otherwise
classifies them separately. Our discussion treats them as separate.
42 In other words, in EPA's classification system "area" sources include not
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There are literally millions of these area sources and hundreds of
thousands are now supposed to be regulated under the federal
system. EPA does not provide exact numbers.
Other than a few nationally distributed consumer products
discussed in part II-vehicles, fuels, paints, and solvents-we
would leave area sources from all source categories under state
regulation as well as 94 percent of all point sources. Nonetheless,
the sources we would put under federal control represent the vast
majority of all interstate pollution.
" Sulfur dioxide. According to EPA estimates, our federally
regulated sources account for 91 percent of emissions from
point sources and 85 percent of total emissions. These
sources would cover an even larger percentage of interstate
pollution because much of the emissions not subject to
federal control come from smaller sources, which tend to
have shorter exhaust stacks so that their emissions are less
likely to travel long distances.
* Nitrogen Oxides. According to EPA estimates, our
federally regulated sources account for 78 percent of the
emissions from point sources and 84 percent of total
emissions. Once again, these sources would cover an even
larger percentage of interstate pollution because much of the
emissions not subject to federal control come from smaller
sources, which tend to have shorter exhaust stacks.
Moreover, some of the emissions not subject to federal
control come from sources impossible to control, such as
forest fires, or that have not been controlled except in
limited areas, such as domestic hot water heaters.
* Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC). According to EPA
estimates, our federally regulated sources account for about
58 percent of total VOC emissions. However, EPA's
estimate is erroneous because it puts mobile-source
emissions at less than 40 percent of total VOC emissions,
while field studies show that the true value is probably
somewhere around two-thirds on average, and as high as
75-80 percent in some areas, including California, Phoenix,
only true "area" sources-i.e., those sources that emit pollutants in a diffuse way,
as in the case of forest fires or dust from construction-but also smaller "point"
sources that emit pollution from an identifiable exhaust stack but whose mass of
emissions are low enough to fall below EPA's threshold for considering it a
"major" source.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2008]
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
the northeast, Atlanta, and Baltimore.43 As a result, our
federally regulated sources actually account for more than
three-quarters of total VOC emissions. Of the remainder,
no single source category contributes a large fraction.
Residential wood combustion (fireplaces and wood stoves)
and gasoline service stations contribute a few percent each.
Fires (forest fires, agricultural burning, building fires) also
account for a few percent. A wide range of industrial,
commercial, and agricultural operations each make small
contributions to the remainder.
0 Particulate Matter (PM). According to EPA estimates, our
federally regulated sources account for 64 percent of PM 10
emissions from point sources and 7 percent of total PM 10
emissions. According to the same estimates, our federally
regulated sources cover 67 percent of PM2.5 emissions from
point sources and 19 percent of total PM 2.5 emissions.
However, these emissions estimates are not particularly
helpful in assessing the extent to which our federally
regulated sources contribute to PM levels in the ambient air.
First, a substantial portion of PM, especially the finer
fractions embodied in PM 2.5 , is "secondary" PM-that is,
PM formed in the atmosphere from gaseous emissions of
NOx, SO 2, and VOC, some of which are converted into,
respectively, nitrate, sulfate, and organic PM. Nitrate and
sulfate (in the form of ammonium nitrate and ammonium
sulfate) account for half to two-thirds of all PM2 .5 in the
43 Y. J. Choi and S. H. Ehrman, Investigation of Sources of Volatile Organic
Carbon in the Baltimore Area Using Highly Time-Resolved Measurements, 38
ATMOSPHERIC ENv'T 775, 781 tbl.2 (2004) (motor vehicle contribution to
anthropogenic (i.e., human-caused) non-methane organic carbon (NMOC)
averaged 72 percent, or 64 percent when natural NMOC emissions were
included); Eric M. Fujita et al., Diurnal and Weekday Variations in the Source
Contributions of Ozone Precursors in California's South Coast Air Basin, 53 J.
AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 844, 844, 862 (2003) ("contributions to ambient
NMHC [non-methane hydrocarbons] by motor vehicle exhaust and evaporative
emissions ... ranged from 65 to 85%"). John Watson reviews eleven studies on
data collected from 1984 to 1996 in various metropolitan areas around the U.S.,
finding that most studies, especially those based on data collected from 1990
onward, suggest mobile sources contribute 50-80 percent of anthropogenic
VOC. A note on terminology: NMOC is essentially the same as VOC because
VOC is understood to exclude relatively unreactive organic gases (such as
methane) that are de minimis contributors to ozone formation. John G. Watson
et al., Review of Volatile Organic Compound Source Apportionment by Chemical
Mass Balance, 35 ATMOSPHERIC ENv'T 1567, 1574, 1580 (2001).
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U.S.,44 and our federal sources account for about 85 percent
of all NO, and SO2 emissions. Most of the remaining PM 2.5
consists of carbonaceous material, both secondary organics
formed from VOC, and directly emitted particles such as
diesel soot and smoke from fireplaces and woodstoves. In
other words, our federally regulated sources account for the
vast majority of PM2.5 in the air, especially the PM2.5 that
travels across state boundaries. Second, much directly
emitted PM comes from agriculture, construction, and other
activity that kicks up dust, as well as windblown dust. Most
of this dust falls back to earth quickly, and therefore
contributes little to PM levels in the ambient air. These PM
sources are not significant contributors to interstate or, in
most cases, even to regional pollution.45 Overall, the
sources we would put under federal control account for
more than three quarters of total PM and for nearly all
interstate PM. A few significant sources of PM emissions
affect only local PM levels near where they are emitted and
would be under state and local control. These include, for
example, wood-smoke emissions from fireplaces and
woodstoves and dust from construction operations.
" Carbon monoxide. According to EPA estimates, our
federally regulated sources account for two-thirds of
emissions from point sources and 83 percent of total
emissions. Most of the remainder is from fires.
" Lead.46 Until the late-1980s, the chief source of airborne
lead was fuel additives. Today, lead emissions are 99
'44 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR
QUALITY, 2002 STATUS AND TRENDS (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/aqtmdO2/2OO2_airtrendsfinal.pdf
45 EPA's PM emissions inventories are a poor guide for the actual sources of
PM in the air because of a combination of inaccuracy in the emissions numbers,
and the fact that much of the presumed emissions fall back to the ground before
traveling far enough to become mixed in with the general ambient air. See, e.g.,
JOHN G. WATSON & JUDITH C. CHOW, RECONCILING URBAN FUGITIVE DUST
EMISSIONS INVENTORY AND AMBIENT SOURCE CONTRIBUTION ESTIMATES:
SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND NEEDED RESEARCH 5-2 to 5-4 (Desert
Research Institute 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/efdocs/
fugitivedust.pdf; RICHARD COUNTESS ET AL., METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING
FUGITIVE WINDBLOWN AND MECHANICALLY RESUSPENDED ROAD DUST
EMISSIONS APPLICABLE FOR REGIONAL SCALE AIR QUALITY MODELING (2001),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/conference/eil O/fugdust/countess.pdf.
46 EPA's AirData does not provide emissions data for lead.
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percent below their 1960s peak. The small amount of
remaining emissions comes mainly from lead added to
aviation gasoline (used only in airplanes with internal
combustion engines but not in jets), with smaller
contributions from lead smelters, waste incineration, and
several other industries.47 Fuels and lead smelters would
remain under federal regulation in our proposal, resulting in
nearly two-thirds of total lead emissions being under federal
control.
Hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). A number of factors
make it difficult to put firm numbers on the fraction of
HAPs that our federally regulated sources account for.
However, it is clear that our proposal would put the vast
majority of estimated HAP risks under federal control.
First, diesel exhaust is the overwhelming source of HAP-
related risks and nearly all diesel emissions would be under
federal control in our proposal. Indeed, EPA recently
reduced by 90 percent the allowable exhaust emissions from
heavy-duty diesel vehicles.48 According to the California
Air Resources Board, diesel exhaust, which EPA does not
include in its estimates of HAP emissions or risks, accounts
for the vast majority of air pollution cancer risk in
metropolitan areas-84 percent in a recent study in Los
Angeles.49 Of the remainder, benzene accounts for about
4.5 percent and 1,3-butadiene 3.3 percent, with other
compounds accounting for the remaining 8.6 percent of air
pollution-related cancer risk.
Although EPA does not estimate cancer risks from diesel
exhaust, it does estimate risks for many other HAPS. In
47 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
LEAD (2008); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR LEAD: POLICY ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION (2007).
48 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT: HEAVY-
DUTY ENGINE AND VEHICLE STANDARDS AND HIGHWAY DIESEL FUEL SULFUR
CONTROL REQUIREMENTS (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/
highway-diesel/regs/f057.pdf.
49 SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MULTIPLE AIR
Toxics ExPosuRE STUDY III (MATES-III), DRAFT REPORT 2-10 (2008),
available at http://www.aqmd.gov/prdas/matesII/draft/cover.pdf ("On average,
diesel particulate contributes about 84% of the total air toxics risk.").
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EPA's 1999 National Air Toxics Analysis, which assesses a
total of 177 chemicals, benzene alone contributes one-
quarter of total estimated national cancer risk from HAPs
(excluding diesel) and 1,3-butadiene contributes 10
percent.50 Mobile sources contribute an estimated 68
percent and 58 percent of total emissions of these pollutants,
while major stationary sources contribute a few percent.5 '
Because diesel exhaust is by far the most important
HAP, and other mobile source emissions account for most
of the risk from non-diesel HAP emissions, our plan
inherently puts the vast majority of HAP concerns under
federal control. In addition, under our plan the largest
industrial HAPs sources-chemical plants, refineries, pulp
mills, power plants, and several others-would also be
under federal aegis.
In any event, HAPs are essentially a local pollution issue
rather than an interstate one because they dilute
significantly over short distances, as shown by some mobile
source examples. Direct measurements of black carbon (a
diesel signature), carbon monoxide (a gasoline automobile
signature), and ultrafine particles (both diesel and gasoline)
near major freeways in Los Angeles show that these traffic-
related pollutants are elevated by a factor of six to twenty on
the freeway, but about 90 percent of this freeway spike is
gone within three hundred feet of the freeway and levels are
down to the regional background again by one thousand feet
from the freeway.52 According to the California Air
Resources Board, levels of diesel pollutants from the ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach drop more than 95 percent
within about ten miles inland from the ports.53
The preceding discussion has shown that the federal
50 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1999 NATIONAL-SCALE AIR Toxics
ASSESSMENT (2008), http://www..epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata1999/nsata99.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2008).
51 Id.
52 See Yifang Zhu et al., Concentration and Size Distribution of Ultrafine
Particles near a Major Highway, 52 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 1032 (2002).
53 CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, DIESEL PARTICULATE MATTER
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT FOR THE PORTS OF Los ANGELES AND LONG
BEACH (2006), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/marine2005/
portstudy04O6.pdf.
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government could address the lion's share of interstate pollution
concerns from criteria pollutants and HAPS, and, at the same time,
leave all but a tiny fraction of sources to state control. It should be
possible to come up with a still better way of minimizing the
number of sources subject to federal control and maximizing
federal control of interstate pollution, because EPA's source-by-
source emission data are messy. A small staff with access to the
raw data would likely need no more than a few months to come up
with the necessary information for refining the allocation of state
and federal responsibilities.
II. CONGRESS SHOULD CONTINUE DIRECT FEDERAL REGULATION OF
EMISSIONS FROM NEW VEHICLES, FUELS, AND A FEW OTHER
NATIONALLY MARKETED GOODS, BUT GIVE MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE LATITUDE TO MANUFACTURERS IN How
TO ACHIEVE CONGRESSIONALLY-SET TARGETS
AND GIVE STATES SOME LATITUDE TO
IMPOSE TOUGHER REQUIREMENTS
A. New Vehicles and Fuels
California began regulating new motor vehicle emissions
during the 1960s, and other states threatened to follow suit. The
federal government got involved only after auto manufacturers
asked Congress to preempt the states and put a federal agency in
charge. After the first Earth Day, Congress stepped in and
imposed a 90 percent reduction requirement in 1970, while
allowing California to impose tougher limits. It eventually gave
other states the option of choosing either the California or the
federal requirements. California used this latitude to continue to
tighten its regulation and thereby repeatedly drove the federal
government to tighten national regulations. Today, with
California, followed by other states, beginning to regulate
greenhouse gases in advance of the federal government, some
manufacturers want the federal government again to preempt the
states. The manufacturers argue that disparate state regulations
would be disruptive.
Federal regulation of new vehicles and fuels should continue
with the states given some latitude to adopt more stringent
requirements. That means, at the minimum, the "two car"
approach by which California can impose tougher requirements,
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and other states choose between the federal and the California
requirements. In addition, Congress should bring vehicle
manufacturers within the system of tradeable emission credits, thus
allowing trading within and between manufacturers' fleets.
Moreover, Congress should allow trading between vehicle
manufacturers and stationary sources.
We do not go into further detail because the essay in this issue
by Andrew Morriss addresses new vehicles and fuels.54 In it, he
discusses ways to give individual states further latitude without
placing unreasonable burdens on automakers and refiners.
B. Vehicles in Use-Inspection and Maintenance
The inspection and maintenance (I/M) requirement is intended
to ensure that motorists keep their cars' emissions low by
identifying and requiring repair of high emitters. These programs
have performed poorly in practice. A 2004 National Research
Council study found that "the nation's [air quality management]
system has not come up with an effective and politically
acceptable means to address" the problem of high-emitting
vehicles. 55  We propose that Congress either eliminate the
requirement that states inspect emissions of vehicles in use, or set
an emissions reduction target for in-use vehicles and give states
complete latitude in how to meet the target.
The Clean Air Act requires inspection and maintenance (I/M)
programs as one of the conditions for EPA approving state
implementation plans in regions classified as at least "serious" for
non-attainment of the NAAQS for ozone or carbon monoxide.56
There were programs in part or all of thirty-three states and
Washington, D.C. in 2005.
EPA regulations specify in detail how states must operate
their I/M programs.57 They must inspect light-duty vehicles (i.e.,
cars, SUVs, minivans, and most pickup trucks) at least biennially
at private garages or at centralized facilities established by
government, usually through contractors. The level that a
54 Andrew P. Morriss, The Next Generation of Mobile Source Regulation, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 325 (2008).
55 See AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 168.
56 42 USC §§ 7511a, 7512a (2000).
" See 57 Fed. Reg. 52950, 52950-53014 (Nov. 5, 1992); U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE (I/M) (2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/im.htm.
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vehicle's emissions may not exceed, the "cut point", can vary from
state to state (and even within states) based on a given region's
non-attainment designation (e.g., "serious", "extreme", etc.), state
legislative and administrative choices, the pollutant at issue, and
the vehicle's vintage.58  EPA also specifies the amount of
emission-reduction credit that the states can claim in their state
implementation plans for operating the I/M program.59 These
claimed reductions were large until 2002, when EPA reduced the
available credit.
While EPA granted states a great deal of SIP credit on paper,
I/M has done little to reduce real-world emissions. A National
Research Council study of I/M programs issued in 2001 found that
measurements of emissions from cars on the road showed that "the
emissions reductions attributable to these programs are from zero
to about one-half of the reductions predicted by the [EPA]
models., 60  The National Research Council found this shortfall
was due partly to EPA overestimating the potential benefits of the
program.61 Manufacturers have become more successful than they
were in the 1970s or 1980s at making cars that stay low emitting
without any special intervention on the part of the motorist.62 For
many cars, therefore, I/M adds no benefit.
The shortfall is also due to I/M programs being much less
successful in finding and repairing vehicles that do become high
emitters than EPA claimed the programs would be. There are a
multitude of reasons for this failure, including program avoidance
on the part of motorists, corruption by vehicle inspectors and
repair shops, and shoddy or incomplete repairs.63
58 See COMMITTEE ON VEHICLE EMISSION INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
PROGRAMS, BOARD ON ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES AND TOXICOLOGY,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD & NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
EVALUATING VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, 72
(2001) [hereinafter EVALUATING VEHICLE EMISSIONS].
59 Each state determines the amount of credit by running EPA's on-road
mobile-source-emissions computer model, known as MOBILE. The latest
version is MOBILE6. Emissions credit for I/M is hardwired into the model and
mainly depends on inputs such as the level of the cut points, the frequency of
inspections, the test type, and the model years of vehicles included in the
program.
60 EVALUATING VEHICLE EMISSIONS, supra note 58, at 2 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id. at 43.
63 PETER MCCLINTOCK, PRESENTATION AT THE 1 5 TH ANNUAL MOBILES
SOURCES/CLEAN AIR CONFERENCE: IDENTIFYING AND REDUCING PROGRAM
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I/M programs are also unpopular. Testing costs billions per
year, financed either by fees on drivers or taxpayer subsidies. The
time involved is also substantial.
In 2001, EPA amended its regulations to allow states to
replace tailpipe testing with a check of the on-board-diagnostic
(OBD II) systems that EPA has required auto manufacturers to
install in vehicles since the 1996 model year.64 These systems do
not measure emissions directly, but are calibrated so that a "check
engine" dashboard light illuminates if the system detects any
condition that might result in excessive emissions. OBD II
systems are not foolproof, however, and cars prior to 1996, which
have the greatest pollution potential, lack such systems.
Although I/M's failures are well documented, EPA
regulations discourage states from finding and fixing flaws in their
programs. States receive emission credit based on having
programs whose features meet EPA specifications, rather than by
demonstrating actual emission reductions. As the National
Research Council found, "EPA has granted states substantial
emissions reduction credits for J/M programs without the need to
verify the extent to which the predicted emissions reductions are
actually occurring. That situation creates a regulatory disincentive
for states to evaluate the actual emissions-reduction benefits from
I/M programs. ' 65  If a state concludes that its program is not
working, it would have to revise its SIP to put additional burdens
on other pollution sources to make up the difference, or else risk
sanctions.
The 2001 National Research Council study has, like many
independent scientists, economists, and policy experts,
recommended that I/M programs focus on the vehicles most likely
to exceed the cut points.66  The National Research Council
AVOIDANCE IN CENTRALIZED I/M PROGRAMS, (1999); D. H. Stedman et al.,
Repair Avoidance and Evaluating Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 32
ENvTL. SCI. & TECH. 1544, 1544-45 (1998); M. McCloy, DEQ Director Grilled;
Emissions Focus of Bribery Scandal, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 22, 1999, at IB;
Amy Ando et al., Costs, Emissions Reductions, and Vehicle Repair: Evidence
from Arizona, Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 99-23-REV, 6-7, Oct.
1999; T. P. Wenzel et al., Short-Term Emissions Deterioration in the California
and Phoenix IIM Programs, 9 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D: TRANSPORT
AND ENVIRONMENT, 107, 111-13 (2004).
64 40 C.F.R. § 86.094-17.
65 EVALUATING VEHICLE EMISSIONS, supra note 58, at 3.
66 Id. at 5.
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repeatedly emphasized that a small number of vehicles produce the
vast majority of "excess" emissions-that is emissions above the
test-failure cut points: "5% of vehicles produc[e] 75% or greater of
excess emissions." 67 The National Research Council concluded
that testing all the vehicles "is inefficient and costly because of the
skewed distribution of emissions across the vehicle fleet; 10-20
must be tested to identify one high-emitting vehicle that is a
candidate for repairs. '68
The time for state I/M programs has likely passed. If these
programs must continue, they should focus on those few
automobiles that cause the most pollution, rather than put all
drivers through an irritating, ineffective, and, for most vehicles,
unnecessary procedure.
One way to home in on these "gross emitters"-the highest-
polluting automobiles-is to schedule for testing only those
vehicle makes and model years whose statistical profile makes
them likelier to be high emitters.69 Another way is to use remote
sensing devices. These devices, placed beside a road, employ light
beams to measure emissions of passing vehicles, and automated
cameras to read their license plates. As the 2004 National
Research Council report stated, "remote-sensing technologies...
are becoming increasingly sophisticated and could provide
accurate measurement of in-use vehicle emissions under actual
driving conditions."
70
Another option is to apply I/M to large trucks and other
heavy-duty vehicles. EPA has no I/M requirement for these
vehicles, even though heavy trucks have larger engines, are used
more hours per day, and last longer.7' Because heavy-duty
vehicles make up an increasing fraction of mobile-source
emissions,72 eleven states already have programs to control in-use
emissions from heavy-duty vehicles, but EPA gives them no
emission-reduction credit for doing so.
The rationale for having an I/M program is much weaker
today than a decade or more ago when manufacturers were less
67 Id. at 44.
68 Id. at 115-16.
69 Id. at 90-91.
70 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 149.
"' Id. at 169.
72 id.
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successful at making cars that stayed clean as they age. A recent
report on a decade's worth of on-road emissions measurements
found that cars in regions with I/M were little cleaner than cars in
regions without I/M and that more recently manufactured cars
deteriorate far more slowly than previous models.73 If the federal
government is going to continue to require I/M for cars, the states
should be free to design their own programs as they see fit. As the
2001 National Research Council study concluded: "[ ]tates should
be given flexibility to choose a regime that meets their emissions-
reduction goals at the lowest cost to the public. 74
C. Certain Other Nationally Marketed Goods
The Clean Air Act now provides for direct federal regulation
of VOC emissions from paints and solvents.75 This regulation
applies to both manufacturers and importers. We recommend that
this system continue.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD RESTORE TO THE STATES THE CHOICE OF
HOW TO DEAL WITH THE REMANING SOURCES
As noted in the introduction, states responded to public
concerns about pollution long before 1970 when the federal
government created EPA and put the states under federal control.
Although states varied in their responses, their efforts resulted in
large reductions in air pollution during the mid-twentieth century.
To build upon this success, Congress should free states from
federal control in dealing with intrastate pollution. The first
section of this part describes the current program under which the
federal government controls how states regulate intrastate
pollution and that program's shortcomings. The second section
recommends that (1) Congress limit the federal role to the
regulatory measures specified in parts I-II with an additional
proviso to deal with interstate pollution problems that might arise;
(2) the federal government provide air quality data and information
to the states and the public; and (3) to ease the transition, Congress
leave current federal air pollutant emission limits (but not process
requirements) in place unless states choose to change them.
13 Bishop & Stedman, supra note 3 at 1654-56.
74 EVALUATING VEHICLE EMISSIONS, supra note 58, at 5.
71 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 751 lb(e), 7671 et seq. (2000).
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A. The Current Program
The NAAQS-SIP process is the main method for federal
direction of states' air pollution regulatory activities. It is severely
troubled. One problem is that EPA has been unable to establish a
coherent basis for deciding at what level it should set the
NAAQS.76 The problem is essentially political. The statute tells
EPA to set the standards without regard either to cost of control or
to whether the standard can be attained. In practice, however,
political and economic realities have meant that EPA has, under
Democrats and Republicans alike, considered other factors beside
health impacts of pollution. Because of the statute, EPA has,
however, had to do so covertly."
Congress's pretense of protecting health without regard to
cost not only misleads the public, but it also makes the Clean Air
Act difficult to amend. At the level of the high-sounding principle
of protecting health without regard to cost, compromise is
impossible. In contrast, where Congress has taken responsibility
for setting pollution reduction targets for particular types of
sources, compromise is possible. For example, some legislators
might believe that emissions from some source category should be
reduced a further 35 percent and other legislators might think the
right number is 28 percent. It is possible to investigate the merits
of both positions and, without losing face, settle on a number. Not
only is compromise possible, but Congress can, by actually
making a decision, lend to EPA the political legitimacy it needs to
move forward with dispatch. Where Congress has taken such
responsibility, the Clean Air Act has been most effective in both
cutting emissions and minimizing process-focused administrative
burdens.
Another difficulty with the NAAQS-SIP process is that EPA
and the states are unable to predict accurately whether a SIP will
achieve the NAAQS on schedule. Such predictions require
inventorying current emissions and then calculating both the
emissions resulting from the SIP's control strategies and the
ambient air quality resulting from these emissions. The process
requires multiple steps, each subject to substantial uncertainty, in
some cases of a factor of two or more, as well as frequent
76 Gary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science
in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1291 (2004).
7 See id. at 1339-47.
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systematic errors.78  Because the errors can be large and
multiplicative, they can lead to grossly under-predicting or over-
predicting future pollution levels. In practice, however, the
tendency has been for states and EPA to under-predict future
pollution levels and thereby falsely claim that SIPs would achieve
the NAAQS on time.
The false prediction of attainment has long been recognized
and is the result of the Clean Air Act's incentive structure. The
Clean Air Act requires states to demonstrate future attainment of
the ambient standards by given deadlines, or suffer sanctions such
as loss of federal highway funding and restrictions on economic
development. However, while imposing daunting penalties for
failing to predict attainment of the NAAQS, the Clean Air Act
imposes slight penalties for failing to deliver on the predictions,
and those penalties are little enforced.79 States therefore naturally
arranged their inventories and modeling so as to predict
attainment. For its part, EPA did not want to impose unpopular,
draconian sanctions for fear of a political backlash against the
agency, and therefore tilted towards approving states' SIPs,
however implausible their predictions might be.
A national commission, which included key members of
Congress, concluded in 1981 that the states and EPA fake
predictions that SIPs will attain the NAAQS. 80  The National
Research Council's 2004 study, Air Quality Management in the
United States, delicately broaches the possibility that the states and
EPA cook the books:
It is possible that the requirement to demonstrate attainment in
a SIP inadvertently encourages the regulatory community to be
overly optimistic when considering the benefits of specific
measures. It is also possible that, in some cases, EPA has
allowed state and local agencies to take large emission credits
78 NRC's 2004 study found that emission inventories have "an uncertainty of
about a factor of two or more, although ... the uncertainty factor is poorly
defined." AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 99. As to the
calculations, "[1]iterature estimates for individual components of an air quality
model--emissions, chemistry, transport, vertical exchange, deposition-typically
indicate uncertainties of 15-30%, but when the supporting data sets are weak, the
uncertainties can be significantly higher." Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
'9 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 125. See also id. at 297
n.6.
" NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR 4, 117
(1981).
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for specific programs to encourage program use and
propagation. Finally, it is possible that EPA has allowed some
to take overly generous emission credits to put off rancorous
policy disputes.
81
When the early SIPs failed to achieve the NAAQS by the
statutory deadlines, Congress extended them, first in 1977 and
again in 1990. It gave the longest extensions to the areas with the
gravest pollution. In this, Congress implicitly traded off the
benefits of cleaner air against the costs of attaining it.
Nonetheless, congressional leaders still maintained the fiction that
costs may not be considered in setting standards.
82
The NAAQS-SIP process is but one example of the Clean Air
Act's focus on process, rather than on results. The Clean Air Act
as a whole has grown from eight ordinary book-length pages of
420 words in 1965 to 85 pages in 1970, 238 pages in 1977, and
450 pages in 1990. The regulations issued under it run to 13,060
pages.83 Then there are tens of thousands of pages of SIPs having
the force of law. No one knows the number of pages of "guidance
documents" explaining what the regulations mean. To this we
must add millions more pages of permits, rate-of-progress reports,
conformity findings, and other implementation documents. The
Clean Air Act creates enough paper to fill many warehouses.
Faced with administering such a behemoth, the agency has missed
most of the statutory deadlines for the Clean Air Act as a whole.
This focus on process hurts the public in many ways, as
illustrated by the waste and ineffectiveness of the I/M program. In
general, the process requirements keep sources from using more
efficient ways to reduce pollution and focus government officials
on wasteful and ineffective paperwork, diverting attention and
resources from activities that would actually clean the air, as the
National Research Council found.84
Moreover, the system is too complicated for Congress to give
coherent instructions to state and federal regulators. For example,
the 1990 version of the statute set specific deadlines for achieving
the then-existing NAAQS and also required EPA to revise those
8 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 129 box 3-7.
82 See ENvTL. POLICY WEEKLY BULLETIN, at A3 (Jan. 29, 1990) (remarks of
George Mitchell).
83 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50-99 (2008) (the number of total pages include the
appendices of the respective sections).
84 See, e.g., AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 128.
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NAAQS when there is new information, but failed to address how
to determine the deadline for achieving a NAAQS once it is
revised. Settling that fundamental question, which in hindsight
had to arise, took years of litigation up to the Supreme Court. A
scholar who had previously worked on the legislation as a
Democratic staffer in the House of Representatives commented:
"Given the detail of the statute, it is hard to believe that anyone in
Congress made a conscious decision to leave the issue
unaddressed. Rather, the intricacy of the statute simply
overwhelmed the legislative process."
85
Environmental advocates have been leery of leaving states to
control intrastate pollution without being policed by the federal
government. Left to their own devices, states will vary in how
they strike the balance between reducing emissions and other
social concerns. Some may well accept more emissions than
others would prefer. But freeing states from federal control on
intrastate air pollution also brings advantages in reducing risk and
advancing other social concerns. If we believed that people would
end up worse off, we would balk at extending the idea of state
control of intrastate pollution to its logical conclusion. We favor
state control of intrastate pollution because of the lessons of
experience.
Some argue that states, left to their own devices, would "race
to the bottom." Not only is this idea based upon questionable
logic, 86 but it is contradicted by experience showing that, where
federal control has been absent, states were more likely to race to
the top. 87 There are many examples of state and local governments
racing ahead of the federal government on air pollution, and, more
recently, in regulating greenhouse gases. Many states and cities
were reducing air pollution for decades before the federal
85 Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American Trucking Part II: Can EPA
Implement Revised Air Quality Standards, 30 ENVTL. LAW REPORTER 10034,
10048 (2000).
86 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
Race to the Bottom Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1210, 1244 (1992).
87 Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in
RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 12-15, 17 (John A. List
& Aart de Zeeuw, eds., 2002); Jonathan Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The
Environmental Challenge'to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 228-229
(2001).
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government stepped in in 1970.88 With the nation wealthier now
than in the 1960s, with concern about the environment rising, even
as ambient pollution levels fall, there is reason to be confident that
states will continue to address their residual air pollution concerns,
with or without federal control or oversight.
Regardless of these concerns, the federal government would,
under our recommendations, control the bulk of emissions of
criteria pollutants. In addition, industries have already borne the
capital cost of pollution equipment, and those that might want to
roll back standards would bear the burden of getting the standards
loosened. Retrenchment is possible through lax enforcement, but
states bring the bulk of enforcement actions under the present
statute and, through timely emission data provided by the federal
government, enforcement policy would be made more transparent
and thus more accountable.
The federal government would also regulate the lion's share
of HAP emissions and any associated risks. But this leaves the
question of the scope of risks left to state control. According to
EPA's 1996 assessment, HAPs (excluding diesel) imposed a
national-average lifetime risk of 55 cases of cancer per 1,000,000
Americans. 89 According to the American Cancer Society, about
41.5 percent of Americans, or 415,000 out of one million people,
will develop cancer at some time during their lifetime. If HAPs
account for 55 of this 415,000, then hazardous air pollutants
(including the federally regulated ones) account for 0.013
percent,90 or about one out of every 7,500 cases of cancer.
We used EPA's assessment for 1996, although newer
estimates are available, because by that year, EPA had done little
to regulate emissions of HAPs from stationary sources, even
though the agency had been under statutory mandate to regulate
them since 1970.91 Meanwhile, states were taking action. For
88 Goklany, supra note 9, at 30; see also JOEL A. TARR, THE SEARCH FOR THE
ULTIMATE SINK ch. 8 (University of Akron Press, 1996); Hugh W. Ellsaeser,
Trends in Air Pollution in the United States, in THE STATE OF HUMANITY 491,
493, 495 (Julian L. Simon ed., 1995); J. H. Ludwig et al., Trends in Urban Air
Quality, E0551, 468-75 (1970).
89 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
NETWORK: 1999 NATIONAL-SCALE AIR Toxics ASSESSMENT (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/natal999/natafinalfact.html.
90 55/415,000 =0.013 percent.
9' Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act mandated regulation of HAPs, but
the agency accomplished little under the 1970 legislation. See Victor B. Flatt,
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example, in response to popular sentiment, Louisiana cut HAP
emissions by one-third from 1988 to 1997.92 Since 1996, EPA has
promulgated dozens of regulations to reduce HAP emissions and
accordingly its HAP cancer risk estimates dropped between 1996
and 1999 from fifty-five down to forty-one per million and are
lower still today.93
The discussion above is based on national averages. Some
counties, of course, have higher-than-average HAP levels, and
therefore, according to EPA, higher HAP-related cancer risks.
According to EPA's 1996 data, the riskiest county was New York
County-that is, Manhattan-where this symposium is being held
and two of the authors live with their families. EPA estimated that
in 1999 HAPs (excluding diesel) imposed an average risk of 136
cancers per million people here, or more than three times the
national average of forty-one per million. The term "Cancer
Alley" is applied to the heavily industrialized area along the
Mississippi river between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Of the
eleven parishes in Louisiana in "Cancer Alley," nine were at or
below the national average of HAP cancer risk and one was
above.
94
Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of the Federal Hazardous Air
Pollutant Program (University of Houston Public Law and Legal Theory Series,
Working Paper 2006-W-01, 6, 2006). The 1990 Clean Air Act amended section
112 to light a fire under the agency, but 4 four of the 108 Maximum Achievable
Control Technology rules that the agency issued since 1990 had an effective date
for existing sources before the end of 1996. The 1996 National-Scale Air Toxics
Assessment (NATA) estimates are based upon the 33 "Urban HAPS," although
diesel particulate matter was not included in EPA's cancer risk assessments.
92 Id. at 75; see also id. at 31 ("Louisiana's current toxic air pollutant control
program covers over 200 pollutants, and tracks toxic air emissions from over 250
industrial facilities.").
9' U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1999 ASSESSMENT RESULTS,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata 1999/nsata99.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
94 The area along the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans has been referred to as the "industrial corridor," the "chemical corridor,"
and "cancer alley." It is apparent from reviewing the literature regarding this
area that there is some fluidity as to which parishes are included in the industrial
corridor. For example, seven parishes were included in the study of cancer
incidence in the industrial corridor conducted by Chen et al., infra note 95, while
a GIS study carried by John K. Wildgen included 10 parishes. See JOHN K.
WILDGEN, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA'S INDUSTRIAL CORRIDOR
(1998), available at http://gis.esri.com/library/userconf/proc98/proceed/TO200/
PAP158/P158.HTM. We expanded our analysis on cancer risks to include all 11
parishes directly bordering the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans. It should be noted that the two parishes in Louisiana with the highest
risk according to the 1996 NATA report were Terrebonne and Vermilion
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Actually, EPA's estimates understate the difference between
New York City and "Cancer Alley" because EPA's estimates do
not include diesel particulates, which are highest in dense urban
areas, such as Manhattan. It should be noted, moreover, that age-
adjusted cancer rates in "Cancer Alley" are generally similar to or
lower than the average for the nation and for Louisiana.95
The preceding paragraphs and a like one in part I.B.5, are the
only two points in this essay where we have cited data on the
health effects of pollution. In general, we have based our
recommendations on how we think it makes sense to structure
environmental law and regulation, rather than on contentions about
the risk associated with various pollution levels. We have brought
up the data on cancer risk to explain why we think that our
proposals would not cause dire risks even if states do not live up to
our expectations. We do not, however, want to leave the topic
without noting in the margins that there is a substantial body of
scientific evidence suggesting that real risk of developing cancer
due to air pollution is much lower than the already-low risks
suggested by EPA's estimates.96 Should scientific understandings
change, not only EPA but the National Cancer Institute and other
federal health entities would be in a position to point out
unresolved problems.
It has been argued that the federal government should
continue to direct the states in order to provide a floor beneath
which air quality cannot go. Yet, the federal floor creates perverse
effects through over-centralization. The perils of over
parishes, with an average risk of 129 and 161 cancers per million persons,
respectively. Terrebonne Parish is directly south of the industrial corridor, and
Vermilion Parish is southwest of the industrial corridor.
95 Vivien W. Chen, et al., Cancer Incidence in the Industrial Corridor: An
Update, 150 JOURNAL OF THE LOUISIANA STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY 158 (1998).
96. Much of this science is collected in STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (Harvard University
Press 1993) [hereinafter BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE]. See also Bruce Ames
& Lois Swirsky Gold, Paracelsus to Parascience: The Environmental Cancer
Distraction, 447 MUTATION RESEARCH 3 (2000), available at
http://potency.berkeley.edu/pdfs/Paracelsus.pdf (demonstrating that doses from
oral exposure, though higher than doses from inhalation, nonetheless are much
lower than the doses needed to cause cancer); Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky
Gold, Misconceptions on Pollution and the Causes of Cancer, 29 ANGEWANDTE
CHEMIE 29 1197, 1200-01 (1990). A poll of independent cancer researchers
suggests that most tend to agree with Ames and Gold. S. ROBERT LICHTER &
STANLEY ROTHMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER-A POLITICAL DISEASE? 69, 88,
122, 162 (Yale University Press, 1999).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 17
AIR POLLUTION: BUILDING ON THE SUCCESSES
centralization are illustrated by the l/M program and the
dysfunctional NAAQS-SIP process. The air pollution control
system, already top-heavy and procedure-bound, will become even
more so if it takes on climate change. To perform effectively the
jobs that only the federal government can do, it needs to let go of
intrastate pollution
Even now, federal supervision over sources of chiefly local
concern prevents states and localities from addressing them in light
of new information or changed circumstances. State and local
governments inclined to take local actions on air pollution have
reason to wait until they know what EPA will ultimately require,
lest they impose requirements that are incompatible with or
-overridden by EPA's commands. This can mean waiting years for
EPA to adopt standards and regulations and for inevitable judicial
review processes to run their course. When new information
suggests that a small source can be adequately controlled in a less
burdensome way than required by the SIP or other federal plans,
changing it requires federal as well as state approval, and the entire
process typically takes many years.97  Moreover, the abundant
activity of Congress and EPA in dictating the terms of the state
response to intrastate air pollution diverts attention from the
federal failures to deal adequately with interstate and international
pollution.
B. Recommendations
1. Congress Should Leave Intrastate Pollution to the States
States have not always been good to their downwind
neighbors. This suggests a role for the federal government in
policing interstate pollution. States tend to fail to address in-state
emission sources that have their main impact on other states. This
failure is no reason to put all sources under federal control, even
though all sources, even the home heating furnace, can in principle
account for at least some pollution that crosses state lines. Most
pollution sources predominantly impact pollution levels within the
state where the emissions occur. That makes state officials
97 William F. Pederson, Why The Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA L.
REV. 1059, 1078-79 (1981). NRC also found that state "[a]gencies with already
strong permit programs thought that the, Title V regulations increased the
complexity of the permitting process without improving the overall results." See
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 191.
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accountable for most of the impact, and that should be enough in a
world where local, state, and federal actions routinely affect those
voting elsewhere.
Our proposals in parts I and II would put under federal control
sources that account for the lion's share of interstate pollution. As
a precaution against states putting looser controls on sources
whose emissions mainly affect air quality in other states, Congress
should enact a golden rule for trans-boundary pollution.98 The rule
would allow a state to get relief from a federal court if an upwind
state imposed less stringent emission limits on sources whose
major impact fell on the downwind states as compared to sources
whose major impact fell on the source state. The application of
such a rule would call for judgment, primarily in deciding which
source categories within the source state are comparable and
gauging whether there are justifiable reasons for differences of
stringency unrelated to disregard of the downwind state.
Nonetheless, such a rule is a good deal more manageable than the
present provision of the Clean Air Act, which has been
unworkable in source by source applications or the law of
nuisance. 99 Moreover, the allocation of sources between federal
and state control that we propose should not be written in stone.
Congress should revise it as understandings of air pollution
change, as new concerns develop, and as old ones fade.
Otherwise, Congress should leave states free to deal with air
pollution as they choose except for those pollution sources
designated for federal regulation. In particular, Congress should
eliminate the NAAQS-SIP process and its manifestations dealing
with "non-attainment" and "prevention of significant
deterioration" as well as the Title V permit program. If a state
wants to go beyond the federal requirements, it is free to place
98 We take the concept from Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE L.J. 931 (1997), but would apply it
differently. His approach has been criticized as ambiguous. Craig Oren, Clean
Air and Interstate Transport: Seeing the Big Picture, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 196,
204 (2002) (this criticism focused on a tougher context where states were the
primary regulators of large sources such as power plants and the relevant
question was apportioning responsibility between states for meeting ambient air
targets. In our proposal, the federal government would regulate the largest
sources and the relevant question would be whether a state imposes less stringent
emission standards on sources whose major impact falls on other states.
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
NUISANCE § 82 IA (1979), PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (1984).
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stricter controls on in-state sources, including federally-regulated
stationary sources.
A corollary would be to end "transportation conformity"
under which state transportation officials must show that federally
funded transportation projects are consistent with the emissions
"budget" in the state SIP. There are many reasons, including
environmental ones, to be concerned about traffic and
transportation infrastructure. However, experience has proven that
technology, in the form of inherently cleaner vehicles, is
eliminating transportation-related air pollutants rapidly and will
continue to do so.'00 It costs tens to hundreds of times more to
avoid a ton of emissions through transportation infrastructure
decisions than through direct emission limits on vehicles.10' The
air quality tail of transportation projects should no longer wag the
mobility dog.
A second corollary would be to end the Clean Air Act's
Visibility/Regional Haze requirements. The current Clean Air Act
system for regulating visibility includes a planning process that
mirrors the NAAQS-SIP process. However, under our proposal,
visibility naturally falls under our direct federal approach to
interstate pollution. Visibility is quintessentially an interstate
pollution issue, and the vast majority of visibility-impairing
emissions come from sources that would be under federal
regulation in our plan.
State and local governments should also retain their
traditional land use (i.e., zoning) authority with regard to federally
regulated sources. So, for example, states would be able to address
pollution hot spots that might occur due to concentrations of
emissions sources--e.g., freeways, ports, or agglomerations of
industrial sources.'0 2 And, as already indicated, they could impose
00 See, e.g., Bishop & Stedman, supra note 3, at 1655.
101 For example, the Federal Transit Administration's annual "new starts"
reports for federally funded rail transit projects include estimates of capital and
operating costs and VOC and NOx emissions (which help form ozone and
particulate matter) avoided from reduced automobile trips. Based. on these
numbers, the emission reductions cost anywhere from hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars per ton of pollution avoided. Regulators normally do not
consider ozone control measures cost effective unless they cost less than about
$10,000 per ton. FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT ON NEW
STARTS (various years), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/printerfriendly/
publications_2618.html.
102 Indeed, the California Air Resources Board recently adopted such
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their own tougher emission limits on federally-regulated stationary
sources.
We recommend that state legislatures structure their
regulations along the same lines we suggest for federal regulation,
but that should be a matter of state prerogative. In particular,
states should provide each source with a comprehensive list of
emission limits to which it is subject, rather than dribbling them
out pollutant by pollutant and program by program. This should
be practicable if states are freed from the Clean Air Act process
and planning bureaucracy.
States should use cap-and-trade for those source categories for
which it is possible to measure emissions accurately and with
appropriate safeguards against hot spots as discussed above. States
should allow state-regulated sources to use federal pollution credits
bought from federally-regulated sources in the same region to
satisfy state pollution limits. 0 3 And just as the federal government
should leave intrastate pollution sources to states, states should in
turn consider leaving regulation of highly localized pollution
sources to municipalities.
2. The Federal Government Should Provide Information to
States and the Public
There may be economies of scale in having the federal
government assemble and provide to the public and states
information on air pollution levels, trends, health and welfare
effects, and control techniques. In addition, federally-provided
information could help overcome information asymmetries that
might exist at the state and local level.
Specifically, EPA should collect and disseminate the
following information:
0 the health and environmental effects of each pollutant at
requirements for ports throughout the state, including those of Los Angeles and
Long Beach. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2299.1 (2008).
Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing "Banker": The Role Of The
Regulatory Agency In Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 269, 305, 313
(2007) (finding that the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program did not work well).
The author concludes that cap-and-trade will not work well unless state
regulators coach the smaller sources. Others might deduce from the same data
that the state regulators botched the job by sending market signals erratically and
failing to include an automatic fine mechanism. In either event, the design of
cap-and-trade programs requires careful attention.
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various concentrations in the ambient air;
* the technologies available to control pollution from various
categories of sources;
* the amount of emissions from individual sources; and
" ambient air quality at various locations around the country.
While EPA should provide health and environmental impact
information, its word should not be gospel. As many
commentators, including Justice Stephen Breyer, have noted, risk
regulators tend to exaggerate the risks they regulate. 10 4 Also,
regulated interests try to subvert the agency science process to
their own ends. Various safeguards, such as EPA's Science
Advisory Board, are far from full-proof checks. In short, it is
impossible to guarantee disinterested agency science. The best
anyone can do is to make the science process as open, competitive,
and disinterested as possible. It is with that objective in mind that
the essay by Angus Macbeth and Gary Marchant suggests reforms.
Another possibility is for the sort of independent information
institute discussed in this Project's proposal to comment from time
to time on the overall objectivity of EPA's risk analyses. Beyond
that, elected officials should seek independent evaluations of
EPA's scientific assessments from a range of outside experts. At
the end of the day, unless EPA acknowledges uncertainties and
minimizes bias, its information will have little credibility. With
EPA no longer directing the states, its only leverage over the states
would come from providing credible information.
EPA would have a particularly important role in collecting
emissions and ambient air quality data. We have already pointed
out several problems with EPA's data. Many of its emissions
inventories are inaccurate, while variations in terminology and
definitions and poor quality assurance impede apples-to-apples
comparisons between data from different states and between
EPA's various emission databases. The National Research
Council's 2004 report concluded that we have "not developed a
comprehensive and quantitative program to track emissions and
emissions trends."' 0 5  Part of the problem is that EPA is so
overwhelmed by its impossibly large regulatory agenda that it
must rely unduly on state data that it too often takes at face value.
One of the advantages of reducing EPA's regulatory role is that it
104 See BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE, supra note 96, at 46-47.
105 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT, supranote 20, at 266.
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could place more emphasis on producing better data.
Credible EPA data would allow people to compare states
based on how well they reduce actual emissions. This would make
the state regulatory process more transparent and create incentives
for state and local officials to produce results. Governors and
mayors do not want their jurisdictions to rank poorly on matters of
concern to their constituents, such as air pollutant emissions or
levels.
3. Congress Should Leave Federal Emission Limits in Place but
Give States the Option of Changing Them
To ease the transition to the system we propose, Congress
should end all Clean Air Act administrative and process
requirements but leave in place all current substantive limits on
emissions. States would then be allowed to either let the federal
emission limits continue or to adopt their own requirements. That
would mean, for example, that the emission limits in EPA's Phase
I regulations of HAPs would remain in force unless a state
affirmatively decided to change them.
CONCLUSION
The plan we propose is a path out of the procedural morass
that the Clean Air Act imposes. Our plan builds on the successes,
refocuses air pollution regulation on results, assigns to the federal
government those issues that it can tackle most efficiently, and
leaves the states to deal with local concerns.
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